TorIX Toronto Internet Exchange Community

Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering

For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 1,066 routes are RPKI invalid and 2,501 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.

89 other route-server members would have every route they originate accepted; 3 originate no routes the collectors see.

Members

Every member on IX Report's lists for TorIX, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.