AS32787 Akamai Prolexic DDoS Mitigation

Announced routes

Every prefix a peer of the route collectors sees with origin AS32787, things to look at first. Visibility = full-table peers that see it, of 673 (IPv4) and 636 (IPv6) on 75 collectors. Also as routes.csv.

AS-SET

PeeringDB's irr_as_set for AS32787: RADB::AS-PROLE. Expanded from the day's IRR dumps the way bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net: a name with a database is read from that database only, one without from the first database in RADB's order. "Not covered" = this network's own routes that a filter built from the set would leave out (AS32787 isn't in the set, or no route object for AS32787 covers the route; more-specifics of a route object are accepted down to /24 and /48, as with bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). Customers' routes aren't counted: the collectors show each route's origin, not which network it came through.

Fix list

The changes that would bring RPKI, the IRR and what's announced into line. Some are deliberate (a route object kept for a backup route, say); the network decides. All 410 are in fix.csv.

• ROA: none67
• Route object: none7
• Route object: RIR77
• Route object: not announced259

Route objects not announced

Route objects with origin AS32787 whose prefix no peer sees AS32787 announce. Many are kept on purpose (backup routes, space announced only in some places).