bgpreport

Exchanges · data from 2026-11-19

F-IX

Fastiv, UA · members from IX Report (2026-11-19)

3Members 2 originate routes
10Their routes 80.0% RPKI valid · 100.0% with a route object
0RPKI invalid from 0 members
2No ROA 0 with no route object for their origin
1AS-SET includes own ASN 0 missing it · 0 not found · 1 none
3Route-server members 0 of their 10 routes left out by an RPKI + IRR filter

Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering

For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 0 routes are RPKI invalid and 0 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.

Every route the route-server members originate would be accepted.

Members

Every member on IX Report's lists for F-IX, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.

AS48438Corbina Telecom AS48438 Yes 87 v4 · 1 v6 100% 0 100% includes own ASN
AS41305UkrNet Fastiv Yes 22 v4 · 0 v6 0% 0 100% none in PeeringDB
AS218262F-IX Route Servers Yes none seen