Exchanges · data from 2026-11-12
GNM-IX US GNM Internet Exchange North America
New York, US · members from IX Report (2026-11-12)
Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering
For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 71 routes are RPKI invalid and 193 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.
| AS30058FDCServers.Net | RADB::AS30058:AS-CONE | 1,037 | 61 | 182 | 186 18% |
| AS49418netshield | RIPE::AS49418:AS-NETSHIELD | 18 | 5 | 5 | 5 28% |
| AS201814Mevspace | AS201814:AS-CLIENTS | 59 | 5 | 5 | 5 8% |
| AS31500GNM | RIPE::AS-GLOBAL-NET | 49 | 0 | 1 | 1 2% |
0 other route-server members would have every route they originate accepted.
Members
Every member on IX Report's lists for GNM-IX US, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.