Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering
For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 0 routes are RPKI invalid and 0 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.
Every route the route-server members originate would be accepted.
Members
Every member on IX Report's lists for IIX-Banten, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.
| AS141626Sandya Networks | 3311 v4 · 22 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS139972PLBNET | 85 v4 · 3 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS150279Lintas Network Solusi | 76 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS138087JAVA MEDIANET TEKHNOLOGI | 54 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS138117Solusindo Basis Teknologi | 43 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS140413Gayuhnet | 43 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS135465BTSNET | 33 v4 · 0 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS149881PT. WIKAPLUS GLOBAL NUSANTARA | 32 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS149944Dak Kite Kih Nabil | 22 v4 · 0 v6 | 100% | 0 |