Exchanges · data from 2026-11-12
Giganet IXN Zaporizhia Ukrainian Backbone Networks
Zaporizhia, UA · members from IX Report (2026-11-12)
Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering
For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 4 routes are RPKI invalid and 5 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.
| AS6768EUROTELE-PLUS | RIPE::AS-EUROTELE | 13 | 2 | 2 | 2 15% |
| AS42714Kichkas Network Ltd. | AS-KICHKAS | 10 | 1 | 1 | 1 10% |
| AS44193GIGANET-X | AS44193:AS-RIPE AS44193 not in it | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 100% |
| AS48648K-Link AS48648 | AS-KLNK | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 6% |
0 other route-server members would have every route they originate accepted.
Members
Every member on IX Report's lists for Giganet IXN Zaporizhia, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.