Exchanges · data from 2026-11-12
Linxdatacenter-IX Linxdatacenter Internet Exchange
Moscow, RU · members from IX Report (2026-11-12)
Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering
For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 1 routes are RPKI invalid and 18 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.
| AS52201TC TEL CENTER AS52201 | RIPE::AS-TCTEL | 20 | 0 | 15 | 15 75% |
| AS31430TC TEL CENTER AS31430 | RIPE::AS-TEL-NET | 35 | 0 | 2 | 2 6% |
| AS48399Linxdatacenter | AS-LINXDATACENTER | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 6% |
1 other route-server members would have every route they originate accepted.
Members
Every member on IX Report's lists for Linxdatacenter-IX, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.