Route servers: RPKI + IRR filtering
For each member on the route servers: of the routes it originates, how many a route server would leave out if it dropped RPKI-invalid routes and filtered on the IRR the way IXP route servers commonly build their prefix lists: the member's AS-SETs from PeeringDB (with none, its own AS number), expanded as bgpq4 does against whois.radb.net, with more-specifics of a route object accepted down to /24 and /48 (bgpq4 -A -R 24 / -R 48). 0 routes are RPKI invalid and 0 fail the IRR filter. Only each member's own routes are counted: the collectors show a route's origin, not which network it came through, so customers' routes aren't in these numbers. Route objects only in LEVEL3 or IDNIC (no public dump) count as missing.
Every route the route-server members originate would be accepted.
Members
Every member on IX Report's lists for IXP LI VAD, with the routes it originates. Also as members.csv.
| AS215956MYIP | 290 v4 · 29 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS57883NITAET | 215 v4 · 16 v6 | 24% | 0 |
| AS139073Fantasy Sky Internet eXchange | 171 v4 · 16 v6 | 94% | 0 |
| AS204374Leonardo de Souza Rodrigues | 160 v4 · 16 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS204508MLGT | 120 v4 · 12 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS142553Air's Project Private Network | 110 v4 · 11 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS4913410VPN Research Network | 40 v4 · 4 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS210633DevStorage | 10 v4 · 1 v6 | 100% | 0 |
| AS49459IXP Route Servers | none seen |